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The purpose of this study was to develop a statistically
validated predictive model for construction design man-hours
to aid in the decision-making process for assigning projects
to PWC engineers and Architect-Engineer firms. This study
was performed at PWC, Great Lakes and consisted of personnel
interviews and the compilation of a database from internal
reports. Although a predictive model was not developed, it
was discovered that the design man-hours estimation
procedure is inaccurate and causes PWC to hold customer
funds that could be used for other purposes. A decision-
making model was developed to assist in assigning projects
to in-house design resources or to Architect-Engineer firms.
In addition, significant cost savings are already being
realized through the use of the Computer Aided Design and
Drafting System, with greater savings projected when the
system is fully installed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In Fiscal Year 1983 Northern Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command delegated the Special Projects program
for 13 mid-western states to Public Works Center, Great
Lakes. The resultant increase in design workload severely
taxed the Center's design staff. Increases in manning level
were authorized but were not sufficient to handle the work-
load. Increased emphasis was placed upon contracting design
with Architect-Engineer firms. the primary concern was
whether it was more cost effective to contract project
design or to retain it in-house. As the amount of work in
the backlog increased, the concern changed to what the
proper mix of Architect-Engineer design and in-house design
should be. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command goal
was set at 20% in-house design and 80% Architect-Engineer
design. Local Public Works Center design managers attempted
to achieve this goal but very quickly realized the
difficulty in attaining the goal and maintaining a viable
design staff. There was a need to develop a set of
decision-making criteria or a statistical model that would
aid in determining which design resource to use for each
project. In addition, the Public Works Center aware of
declining productivity in the face of the increasing
workload. This decline was adversely affecting not only
relationships with customers but the cost of doing business,
by increasing the unit cost of performing design.
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
The original objective of this thesis research was to
develop a statistically validated decision-making model for
use in determining whether to retain design in-house or to
contract it to an Architect-Engineer firm. In addition, an
objective analysis of the organization and management of the
design division should yield recommendations that will
improve productivity and favorable affect the unit cost of
performing design.
Analysis of internal reports, records, and design
practices for construction design, with emphasis on the
decision process, accompanied by a well-structured database
should achieve the following objectives:
1. Provide the development of a decision-making model for
deciding which design resource to use.
2. Provide recommendations to improve productivity in the
construction design process.
3. Provide examples of possible cost savings to be
obtained by the implementation of a decision-making
model and productivity improvements.
C. METHODOLOGY
The research was conducted in three phases. The first
phase was a review of pertinent literature and data
collection. The literature search was conducted at the
Naval Postgraduate School library and the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange for theses, papers, articles or
other publications that might have a bearing on this study.
The collection of data took place in September 1986 at
Public Works Center, Great Lakes, Illinois and included data
from FY83 through FY86.
The second phase included performing numerous analytical
computations to determine the feasibility of developing a
statistical model to aid in design man-hour data were used
to predict actual design man-hours in an effort to develop a
predictive model. It was at this point that the discovery
of extremely inaccurate design estimates was made. in
analyzing the effect, it was determined that design man-
hours estimates alone could not predict actual design man-
hours. To develop a model to accurately predict (or
estimate) design man-hours might require more data than were
available. Some of the desired information was simply not
recorded in any internal or external reports. Other
information could not be accurately and consistently
extracted from the data sources available. Even with
additional data, however, it is possible that no reliable
predictive model could be derived from past experience.
The third phase of research was the analysis of
management and design practices in Production Engineering
and Production Scheduling. Through interviews with PWC
personnel at several levels of the organization, a picture
of the decision-making process was developed. Comparisons
were made with the Public Works Operations Manual [Ref. 1],
good management practice (as generally described in the




Chapter II provides a background discussion of the
purpose and function of the Public Works Center,
specifically PWC, Great Lakes. The sources of work and flow
of work pertaining to design is discussed and diagrammed.
Finally, the critical points in the decision-making process
are explained
.
Chapter III is a brief explanation of cost and its
components. Cost analysis is defined from the perspective
of the customer and the Public Works Center.
Chapter IV describes the methodology of the thesis
research. Included are the development of the database, the
analytical computations, the explanation of regression
analysis, and an explanation the failure of model
f o rmulation .
Chapter V is an examination of the computations and
regression analysis in the previous chapter. Included are
the findings from the analysis of management and design
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practices. Where applicable, findings are related to cost
both to the customer and to PWC
.
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with a summary of the
background discussion, the major findings of the study,
recommendations for improvement, and areas for future
research .
E. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Increases in design staff of PWC, Great Lakes have been
only partially successful in meeting the heavy design
requirements. Reliance upon A-E design has increased but has
presented its own difficulties. There are several areas
that need improvements. First, estimating design man-hours
requires improvement. No predictive model was developed to
estimate design man-hours. Second, project scheduling
procedures need to be standardized. Third, the internal
reorganization or Production Engineering needs to be
monitored to insure that it has the desired effect of
increasing productivity. finally, the CADD system appears
to be meeting the projections for cost savings. PWC needs
to expedite the installation and implementation of this
system, as it portends significant improvements
in productivity and design quality.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. PUBLIC WORKS CENTERS
In general, Public Works Centers (PWC's) were developed
in order to provide facility maintenance and repair services
to large groups of Navy shore activities in widely scattered
geographical locations. PWC's are responsible for the
maintenance, repair, renovation, and demolition of Navy and
Marine Corps real property and utilities within their
geographical jurisdiction. Seven PWC's worldwide serve the
entire Navy shore establishment. In order to perform their
function, PWC's are outfitted with intrinsic construction
design forces. The major purpose of these design forces is
to provide the Navy with in-house professional engineers to
develop plans and specifications for the maintenance and
repair of real property and to provide professional review
of designs accomplished by architect-engineer (A-E) firms.
These design forces are intended to provide rapid, cost-
effective design for PWC shop forces and civilian
contractors as the need arises. All PWC's operate within
the Navy Industrial Fund. The Navy Industrial Fund allows
the PWC to charge the customer command for work performed
for that specific activity. There are also specific areas
of work that must be funded by the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM) itself. NAVFACENGCOM is
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the sponsor of the PWC's, through six Engineering Field
Divisions located throughout the United States. Because of
these funding requirements, the need for attention to costs
is particularly important. Design costs are a major portion
of a PWC's budget. Since one of their major products is
design and since these costs can be controlled, design costs
become extremely important to the successful operation of a
PWC.
B. PWC, GREAT LAKES
PWC, Great Lakes is the Public Works Center serving the
northeast quadrant of the United States, falling under the
supervision of Northern Division, Naval Facilities Engineer-
ing Command (NORTHDIV). Until Fiscal Year (FY) 1983 PWC,
Great Lakes had as its main responsibility the minor mainte-
nance and repair of buildings and facilities within its
geographical area. Most work was done by PWC shop forces in
local areas and by contract in remote areas. The limitation
of local authority to do maintenance and minor repair was
$25,000 per project for normal maintenance and $75,000 for
minor repair. Any project outside these limits required
prior approval by Northern Division, Naval Facilities Engi-
neering Command. Prior to FY 1983, NORTHDIV had the respon-
sibility for Special Projects (maintenance greater than
$25,000; repair greater than $75,000), Minor Construction,
and Military Construction (MILCON). Because of the
13
increasing workload and lack of timely response, NORTHDIV
delegated the Special Project program to PWC, Great Lakes.
[Ref. 2]
The advantage to the customers was to be threefold.
First, PWC, Great Lakes was in closer geographic proximity
to the majority of work required. NORTHDIV is located in
Philadelphia. Second, there is a greater availability of
A-E firms in the Chicago area than in Philadelphia for those
projects requiring design by professionals outside the PWC.
Finally, it was believed that local control of the Special
Project Program would expedite services all the way from
design to completion. The advantages to the PWC were
greater control over its own work schedule and the
capability for more effective planning of maintenance and
repair work needing to be done. [Ref. 1]
C. PRODUCTION ENGINEERING
Located in the PWC organization is the Production
Engineering Division, Code 420 (see Figure 1). The function
of this group is to prepare technical documents for
maintenance and repair of facilities. The technical










- Technical portions of maintenance service contracts
In order to accomplish this work, the Production Engineering
Division carries an array of engineering skills, including
architects, civil engineers, electrical engineers, mechan-
ical engineers, draftsmen, and engineering technicians. In
addition, the division includes support staff such as secre-
tarial skills, specification writers, and a librarian.
Figure 2 shows the organizational structure of Code 420 at
PWC, Great Lakes. [Ref. 1]
Although the majority of the delegation of work from
NORTHDIV did not occur until FY 1983, two Special Project
plans were reassigned in FY 1982. In FY 1983 the major
portion of Special Project work was delegated to PWC, Great
Lakes. During this time the number of design personnel in
Code 420 increased very little and very slowly. While some
of the Special Project work was done by in-house design
forces, it became necessary to rely upon A-E firms to an
increasing extent. Appendix A gives an historical breakdown
of total manhours, total dollars, and percentage of total
workload assigned to in-house and A-E design forces.
NORTHDIV's informally stated goal for desired percentages of




































































With the delegation of the Special Projects program
from NORTHDIV came the challenge of actually increasing
services by providing engineering services in a lesser
amount of time. Initially, Production Engineering set a
goal of 180 days average completion time from receipt from
the customer to completion of final plans and specifications
prior to contracting (or scheduling by PWC shop forces).
The additional challenge presented by the offload was to
develop an estimate of what it cost to accomplish a design.
At this point the first emphasis on controlling design cost
arose. However, due to the volume of work, nothing was done,
Although Code 420 staff grew from FY 1983 to FY 1985, it
became clear that, because of the increased restrictions on
hiring practices in the Federal sector, expanding the
engineering staff to the desired level would be impossible.
Nevertheless, the workload for the design division kept
increasing. As workload increased, the backlog of work
awaiting design increased, thus increasing the amount of
time taken to produce designs and contracts. This time
delay resulted in greater costs as inflation affected
construction costs. In addition, the lack of staff
increased the pressure to perform and lead to a tendency to
produce hasty designs requiring extensive rework, thus
increasing the cost of design. Out of this environment was
born the need to look at and control the cost of design.
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D. WORK FLOW
1 . Types of Work .





This work entails major repair, replacement, and
renovation of plant property facilities, it generally
requires more than 80 hours of effort by PWC shop forces,
and may be accomplished by PWC ship forces or contractors.
b. Minor Work.
This work consists of minor construction,
alterations, maintenance, and repair of plant property
facilities. this work requires more than 16 and less than
80 man-hours for completion, and may be accomplished by PWC
ship forces or contracts. When contractors perform work of
this nature, it is generally because the work requires
skills not available to PWC forces.
c. Recurring Work.
This is maintenance work of a recurring nature
and has no specific, man-hour guidelines. This work is
basically preventive and corrective maintenance on existing
facilities and utilities. It is generally accomplished by
PWC ship forces. When it is accomplished by contractors,
the work is performed under a maintenance service contract.
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d. Emergency/Service Work.
This type of work encompasses any situation
requiring immediate attention (such as a ruptured water
pipe or clogged toilet). Normally these situations require
less than 16 man-hours to correct. This work is performed
entirely by PWC ship forces unless there is an emergency
service clause written into a maintenance service contract.
2. Sources of Work .
There are basically only two sources of work (al-





Tenant activities (all activities within tlie
geographical area served by PWC, Great Lakes) request work
to be done by PWC. They submit work request for specific
and minor work which may or may not ultimately be
accomplished by PWC work forces. Any design requirements
may also be performed by either in-house engineers or A-E
firms. Work exceeding the man-hour limit for specific work
or the dollar limitations for repair and maintenance is then
submitted as a special project.
b. Public Works.
Because PWC is charged with the maintenance and
repair of all real property, work is generated through
normal inspection of facilities and through long-range plan-
ning of repair, replacement, demolition, and new
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construction. Work may be specific, minor, or of such scope
as to require a special project, minor military construc-
tion, or MILCON (the distinctions between these categories
is based upon the dollar value of the cost estimate). Most
of the minor work is scheduled for PWC ship forces to accom-
plish, while large projects are contracted out. Design,
however, may be accomplished by either in-house staff or A-E
f i rras .
c. Special Projects.
Whenever work requested exceeds $25,000 for
maintenance and $75,000 for repair /al terat ion, it must be
submitted as a Special Project. Special Projects are
basically specific work that exceeds local PWC authority to
approve. The maximum limit for Special Project work is
$200,000. It is this portion of the workload that NORTHDTV
delegated to PWC, Great Lakes in 1982. Work on these
projects is performed almost exclusively by contractors.
However, design may be accomplished either in-house or by
A-E's. By FY 1984 the offload of Special Project work had
reached 122 projects totaling nearly $20 million in
construction work [Ref. 2].
3 . Flow of Work .
The basic flow of work through the PWC organization
is shown in Figure 3. The requirement for work is generated
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the form of a work request. Each work request is logged in
as to date received, type of work, date desired by the
customer, and estimated cost. All work requests received
during a particular week are screened by a screening
committee. This committee is made up of representatives
from the Production Management (Code 350), Production
Engineering (Code 420), and Planning (Code 100) Divisions.
Their purpose is to screen the work requests for assignment.
The first assignment made is whether the work request will
be designed by in- house staff or by an A-E firm. The second
assignment is whether the actual work will be performed by
PWC shop forces or civilian contractors. Once assigned,
work requests designated to be designed by either in-house
or A-E firms are forwarded to Production Engineering. At
this point the division head of Production Engineering
evaluates the work request with respect to the skills and
manpower available to him and makes a final recommendation
as to in-house or A-E design. The Engineer-in-Charge (EIC)
then estimates the number of manhours required to develop
the necessary design for plans and specifications. Once
this estimate in completed, the work request is sent to the
customer for funding of the design. When the work request
is resubmitted, it is screened again by the screening
committee to evaluate the need for any changes in
assignment. The work request is then sent to the Production
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Management division to await scheduling. Once scheduled,
the work request (now a job order) is forwarded to
Production Engineering (Code 420) for either actual design
or preparation of documents to allow an A-E to do design.
Once design is completed and approved by Production
Engineering, the plans and specifications are given either
to the Contracts Division or to PWC ship schedulers for the
actual accomplishment of the work. [Ref. 4]
E. DECISION POINTS AND VARIABLES
1 . Screening Committee
As mentioned above, this committee meets weekly to
determine the basic disposition of woric requests submitted
or resubmitted to PWC for action. This committee consists
of the following representatives:
a. Production Department Head, Code 30
b. Planning/Engineering Department Head, Code 400
c. Production Management Representative, Code 350
Senior Activity Civil Engineer, Code 110
Production Engineering Representative, Code 420
Planning/Estimating Representative, Code 430
g. Contract Department Representative, Code 90
Each work request is evaluated with respect to priority,
current, working (cost) estimate (CWE), current workload,
current backlog, manpower availability projections, and in-
housecapability.
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The work request is first evaluated by the dollar
value of the current working estimate (CWE). This will
provide an initial indication of who will perform the work.
Large dollar value projects (those greater than $25,000) are
generally reserved for accomplishment by contractors.
Projects beneath the $25,000 ceiling are evaluated further
in deciding who should perform the work. The decision on
who performs the design is based upon the perceived
capability of PWC to handle the design and the availability
of A-E firms to do the design. As a general rule, extremely
large projects are reserved for the A-E firms, while
extremely small projects are given to PWC design forces.
There is no apparent dollar volume that truly defines
extremely large. Under $10,000 is generally accepted to
define extremely small dollar value. In cases where work
falls into the Special Project category, the work request is
returned to the customer for preparation of the proper
paperwork
.
The work request is then evaluated according to
priority. There are basically five levels of priority (see
Figure 4). Customers request a priority based upon their
time requirements and the importance of the project to their
activity. The Screening Committee evaluates that priority
on the basis of PWC plans, availability of manpower, and
whether the customer has made funds available. It is their
25
GREEN LIGHT : The highest priority available; assigned
only by the Commandant, Naval Training Center (flag rank);
this work is of such immediate nature that it requires
rescheduling all other work necessary to accomplish it in a
timely manner. [Ref. 5]
PRIORITY 1 ; The highest priority assigned by PWS; this
work is of an urgent nature and requires attention as
quickly as possible without disrupting the current schedule.
The serious nature of work dictates little delay in accom-
plishment .
PRIORITY 2 : This work is of an important nature but
does not have the urgency to displace other work in the
schedule. This is generally the highest priority assigned
to customer work requests.
PRIORITY 3 : This priority is assigned to specific and
minor work of the nature of alteration or renovation; there
is little sense of urgency; the work will be accomplished as
openings appear in the work schedule.
PRIORITY 4 : This work can be deferred without major
problems or to work that will be funded at a later date.
This work will be accomplished when there is not other work
of higher priority available. There is no urgency in this
work. Generally this is discretionary work.
Figure 4. Levels of Priority
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option to upgrade, downgrade, or allow the customer's
priority to stand.
Once the prior two evaluations have been made, the
Production Scheduler evaluates the work request with respect
to the current backlog both in Production Engineering and
the PWC shops to se if there might be a lengthy delay in
either design or accomplishment of work. The current
manpower availability projections are also considered. An
initial recommendation is made for in-house or outside
accomplishment and for in-house or A-E design.
At this point, the Production Engineering
representative will evaluate the work request as to its
technical requirements and the availability of the necessary
skills to design the project in-house. Projects initially
recommended for either in-house or A-E design may be
reversed at this point on the basis of Code 420's perception
of conditions within his division that affect his capability
to accomplish design work. Once all variables have been
evaluated, the committee arrives at a consensus concerning
the initial disposition of each work request. Work requests
not requiring engineering are forwarded to the Planning/
Estimating Divisions; work requests requiring engineering
or fundable estimates are forwarded to Production Engineerinj
for action.
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2. Production Engineering Division Head .
The Division Head receives work requests requiring
action from the screening committee. He forwards the work
request to the EIC whose job it is to estimate the number of
manhours it will take to design the project. Once he has
completed his estimate, he returns the work request to the
division head who then makes the final decision regarding
in-house or A-E design. He takes into account the following
factors.
a. Size of Job.
The size of the job in terms of dollars and
estimated manhours to accomplish the design is evaluated
with respect to current backlog and manpower availability.
In addition, the Division Head evaluates the size of the job
with respect to an A-E firm's ability to do business with
the government profitably. Small jobs for small dollar
values are very difficult to make a profit on. The EIC may
also recommend that small jobs or jobs of like design
requirements be combined.
b. Complexity of Job.
The complexity of the job may require special
design skills not available to PWC. Conversely, certain
jobs may require historical information or understanding of
special conditions that would require in-house design.
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c. Current Skill Inventory.
If there are staff engineers with the resident
skills and experience to design the project and other
factors are consistent, the design will be accomplished in-
house. Specialty skill requirements will almost always
result in an A-E firm doing the design.
d. Training Requirements.
Certain jobs may be perfect for A-E design, but
PWC has a responsibility to provide training and experience
for younger engineers and engineering technicians. So, some
jobs will be designed in-house to meet this need.
e. Current Backlog.
The Division Head evaluates the current backlog
based upon engineering discipline (as opposed to strictly
man-hours as done by Production Management). This may
dictate a change in which design resources are used.
f. NAVFAC Goals.
As stated previously, the goal is to only do 20%
of the total design work by in-house forces, leaving 80% to
be done by A-E firms. The Division Head will evaluate each
work request based upon his perception of the current
percentage of work assigned to each resource.
g. Current A-E Load.
The Division Head must also take into account
what A-E skills are available and how much workload they
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have been assigned thus far in the fiscal year. Since most
A-E design is done on "open end" contracts (where a certain
dollar volume of work is promised and work is assigned by
work order), the Division Head must balance the workload of
all A-E firms under contract and be sensitive to their other
business requirements.
Once the Division Head has taken into account all
the above factors, he must make his final decision based
upon his evaluation of overall capability to do the design
in a timely fashion. The Division Head is hampered by the
fact that design manhour estimating is an inexact science at
best. Also, there are times when the evaluation criteria
conflict and his recommendation becomes a "best guess" as to
what should be done. In addition, the Division Head is
faced with customers desiring input into his decision by
asking for a particular resource be used, despite the
professional evaluation of the other factors. Upon the
assignment of the design as to in-house or A-E, the
Division Head forwards the work request to Production
Management for scheduling. [Ref. 6]
3 . Production Manager .
The production manager dealing with engineering
design has only one basic concern - scheduling work by
raanhours for the Production Engineering division. In
general, whatever the EIC has decided upon concerning the
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design forces to be used is agreed to by the scheduler.
Both in-house designs and A-E designs require work by
Production Engineering. In-house projects require
preparation of plans and specification, while A-E design
projects require the preparation of technical documents
prior to release to an A-E firm. When the backlog is larger
than normal, the scheduler will recommend a reevaluation of
all work requests in the backlog by the screening committee





The main emphasis of this treatise is control of design
man-hours within the Production Engineering Division of PWC,
Great Lakes. The importance of man-hour management is cited
below :
It seems apparent that design time is an important civil
engineering resource that must be allocated as efficiently
and effectively as possible. In a period of increasingly
austere manning and budgets, design time is a scarce
resource that demands positive management and control.
[Ref . 7 ]
There are two aspects of cost that must be dealt with.
First, cost can be defined as cost to the customer. In this
case cost is driven by t!ie number of man-hours expended in
performing design. Second, cost can be defined as the
expense of operating the PWC. In each case, the signifi-
cance of controlling design time is slightly different.
From the "cost to customer" viewpoint, the fewer design
hours expendeil, the lower the cost of the project. From the
"PWC operating cost" perspective, efficient use of design
man-hours lowers the cost per work request of design
services, thereby decreasing cost to PWC. PWC's motivation
for managing cost is accountability to both customers and
NAVFACENGCOM.
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B. EXPLANATION OF COST
Once a project has been accepted by PWC and a man-hour
estimate for design has been made, the customer must provide
funds to pay for project design. The connection between
man-hours and customer funds is the billing rate. The
billing rate is multiplied by the estimated man-hours to
reflect the payment due from the customer. The billing rate
reflects PWC's cost of doing business. It consists of a
standard hourly rate, an acceleration rate, and an applied
overhead rate. In cases where overtime is used, a premium
rate is added to the normal billing rate in order to
calculate the overtime rate.
The standard hourly rate reflects the weighted average
cost of engineers, engineering technicians, draftsmen, and
secretaries in the production Engineering division. Both
productive and non-productive personnel are included in this
rate. Throughout PWC each productive division has its own
separate billing rate, so all non-productive personnel are
charged to their respective departments as opposed to being
included in applied overhead. [Ref . 8]
The acceleration rate simply consists of fringe benefits
for the personnel in the Production Engineering division.
Specifically, these benefits include Social Security, annual
leave, sick leave, insurance, and retirement benefit costs.
[Ref. 8]
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The overhead cost consists of an assessment of plant
property cost and depreciation cost (both based upon sqaare
footage), utility usage, provision for capitalized equipment,
provision for inflation, and provision for other economic
factors affecting PWC ' s cash flow. [Ref. 8]
C. COST SAVINGS CONSIDERATIONS
The purpose of addressing cost issues is to identify
possible areas of improvement. The results of model
formulation and analysis of design management practices of
PWC's Production Engineering division may slgai. ficantly
affect the customer's cost of design. In addition, any
inefficiencies discovered also affect the productivity and
therefore the unit cost of design for PWC. An attempt is
made to evaluate the dollar value of savings to the customer
where savings in design time can be realized. Not enough
inforaatioa was collected on site to enable the calculation
of a unit design cost. Nevertheless, possible areas for
prodiictLvity improvement are noted for PWC.
All analysis has been conducted using man-hours as the
base. Man-hours have the unique distinction of being
unaffected by inflation. Applying the billing rate to man-
hours gives direct value to the design. Any savings will be
immediately recognized. A billing rate of $30 per man-hour
has been assumed, as the actual rate is proprietary
information of PWC, Great Lakes.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
A. DEVELOPING THE DATABASE
1 . General
The data for the research were collected at the
Public Works Center (PWC), Great Lakes, Illinois. The data
were retrieved from various reports and records held within
the Production Management Division, the Production
Engineering Division, and the Comptroller Division. all
within PWC. Although data were collected from FY83 through
FY86, only the FY85 data were used in the analysis, as it
was the only year that complete records from all three
divisions could be matched against one another. Older
records in some cases had been destroyed or stored in
facilities that were inaccessible. At the time of the
study, records for FY 86 were not complete and would have
been sent too late for inclusion in the analysis.
The data base consisted of 144 work requests from
FY85. This does not reflect the entire number of work
requests processed in FY85. Rather, 144 was the total
number of work requests that were able to be matched through
the various internal reports and records kept by PWC.
Maintenance service contracts were not included in this
number, since little or no actual design work was required
and the Technical Specification writer was located in
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Production Engineering. The Specification writer also had,
as a part of his duties, the drafting of specifications for
projects being referred to A-E firms.
2 . Components .
Twenty components of data were recorded for each
work request from the PWC internal reports. Some of these
components are self-explanatory while others require an
explanation :
a. Estimated Total Design Man-hours -- This reflects the
aggregate of the design man-hour estimate, including
supervisory and technical specification writer's time,
b. Estimated Total Design Man-hours without Overhead --
This reflects the aggregate of the design man-hour
estimate minus the supervisory and specification
writer estimates.
c. Estimated 420A Man-hours -- This is the estimate of
administrative man-hours for project design.
d. Estimated 421 Man-hours -- This is the estimate of
Civil engineer man-hours required for project design.
e. Estimated 422 Man-hours -- This is the estimate of
Mechanical Engineer man-hours required for project
design .
f. Estimated 423 Man-hours -- This is the estimate of
Electrical Engineer man-hours required for project
design
.
g. Estimated 424 Man-hours -- This is the estimate of
Architectural man-hours required for project design.
h. Estimated 420T Man-hours -- This is the estimate of
Engineering Technician man-hours required for project
design .
i. Key Code -- This is an internal code reflecting the
type of work required by production engineering.
Appendix B contains the list of key codes.
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j. Estimated Number of Skills -- this reflects the
estimated number of different skills required to
design a particular project.
k. Actual Number of Skills -- This reflects the actual
number of skills required to design the project.
1. Actual Total Man-hours -- This is the actual number of
aggregate man-hours the project design took.
ra. Actual 420A Man-hours -- This is the actual number of
administrative man-hours spend on project design and
approval
.
n. Actual 421 Man-hours -- This is the actual number of
Civil Engineer man-hours spent on project design.
o. Actual 422 Man-hours -- This is the actual number of
Mechanical Engineer man-hours spent on project design.
p. Actual 423 Man-hours -- This is the actual number of
Electrical Engineer man-hours spent on project design.
q. Actual 424 Man-hours -- This is the actual number of
Architectural man-hours spent on project design.
Actual 420T Man-hours -- This is the actual number of
Engineering Technician man-hours spent on project
design .
Calendar Days to Complete -- This is the number of
calendar days each project took to complete,
commencing the first day labor hours were charged to
the project and ending the last day labor hours were
charged to the project.
t. Work Days to Complete -- This was calculated from the
calendar days to complete by using a pre-deter mined
factor (that reflects weekends, holidays, etc.) to
arrive at the actual number of work days each project
took to complete, commencing with the first day labor
was charged to the project and ending the last day
labor was charged to the project.
3 . Compilation .
The data were compiled using the MINITAB function of




data were stored in a two-dimensional array with 20 columns
and 144 rows. Appendix B displays the entire database.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATABASE
1 . General .
Each of the 20 data elements was collected to enable
the analysis of trends, comparisons, and formulation of
predictive models. Not all data elements were considered to
be relevant to all computations.
2 . Descriptive Statistics
Figure 5 reflects various descriptive breakdowns of
the database. Total estimated man-hours were broken down
into two categories, because not all jobs had estimates for
supervisory time required for project design functions. PWC
began to include supervisory estimates on all projects in
FY86.
In the aggregate, estimated design hours exceed
actual design hours by a substantial margin. Several reasons
explain the disparity. First, some projects were simply
overestimated. Second, some projects were submitted for
design and then were canceled prior to completion of
design. Finally, several similar jobs were designed
simultaneously and caused significant reduction in design
time. Information to separate projects by these classes was
not readily available at the time of this study.
TOTAL ESTIMATED HOURS
- with supervisory hours 17,534.0
- without supervisory hours 16,501.0
- actual hours 11,107.9



















































Figure 5. Total Estimated Hours
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The significance of overestimated hours is that they
represent customer funds that are provided prior to design.
Inaccuracies in estimating design man-hours result in
PWC holding customer funds for long periods of time. These
extra funds are returned to the customer, but many times
they are returned too late to be effectively and efficiently
reprogr am raed. The significance of underestimated hours is
that they represent cost overruns. The customers must
provide further funds before design may continue. Once this
money is obligated and design charged against it, there is
no getting it back. Overruns require immediate repro-
gramming in most cases. Governmental accounting practices do
not permit indiscriminate shifting of funds between over-
and underestimated projects.
Figure 6 shows the relative frequency of occurrence
of over- and underestimated design time, broken into various
classes. Each project was evaluated by comparing estimated
total design hours with actual total design hours and
determining the percentage difference. If estimated man-
hours were greater than actual man-hours, an overestimate
occurred; if actual man-hours were greater than estimated,
an underestimate had occurred. The calculated percentages
were then sorted into the listed ranges to provide an
































OVER- AND UNDERESTIMATED DESIGN HOURS
(percentage ranges)










Hrs > 100% 50
+ 100% < Hrs > -100% 94
+ 75% < Hrs > -75% 85
+ 50% < Hrs > -50% 71
+ 25% < Hrs > -25% 36
+ 10% < Hrs > -10% 18








The sample size, means and standard deviations were
calculated on 19 of the components in the database to
provide basic information concerning the relative dispersion
and variability of the information collected. This
information is shown in tabular form in Figure 7.
Calculations were not performed on the Key Code column, as
it is a numerical code signifying the type of work. An
analysis of the results for each column was conducted to
determine trends, similarities and differences.
2 Total Estimated Hours .
The most significant information contained in these
statistics is the difference between total estimated hours
(with supervisory hours included) and actual design hours
(Row 1 - Row 3). The average difference is 44.7 hours which
represents a mean overestimate of 58% of the actual hours.
3
.
Estimated Hours (without Supervisory hours) .
Subtracting out supervisory hours leaves a mean
differences between actual and estimated hours of 37.5 hours
or 49% (Row 2 - Ro\^ 3). The reason for this improvement in
accuracy was stated previously as the failure to estimate
supervisory hours for all projects.
4 Individual Skill Estimates vs Actual .
The difference between actual and estimated means
in all skills (rows 4-15) indicated overestimates, with
42
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the minimum being 51% and the maximum being 108%. Median




Estimated vs. Actual Skills .
Statistical evaluation (rows 18-19) merely indicates
that more jobs required an average of two skills than the
original estimates indicated. The most probable cause for
this observation is that in very few of the cases was the
supervisory skill estimated when it was in fact required.
6 Time to Complete
The large difference between the means and medians
of both calendar and work days to completion indicates the
presence of some large outlying values. Tt must be remem-
bered that these times represent only the actual time these
projects were available to Production Engineering. Data
were not readily available to calculate average waiting time
in the backlog, the time taken in transmittal of work
requests, or time required to perform the work.
D. COST MODEL FORMULATION
"Cost models applied to A&E contract estimation may be
beneficial to the EIC in determining 'ballpark' totals to be
used as a guide in developing estimates." [Ref. 9] The main
emphasis of this study is to develop a general cost model
for accurately estimating design time, whether in-house or
by an A-E. Unfortunately, the results of regression
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analysis (to be discussed in the next chapter) indicated
that the current accuracy of estimated design time is within
plus or minus 50% of actual design man-hours less than 50%
of the time. In order to design a significant cost model, it
is necessary first to have a much more significant
relationship between estimated and actual design time. Data
elements such as the current working estimate, modularity,
and complexity were not available. Specific data elements
concerning construction (such as number of drawings required
and type of facility being worked on) were available in





A. EVALUATION OF STATISTICS
1 . Supervisory Hours .
The issue of supervisory hours is significant for
several reasons. First, supervisory hours were not
estimated or recorded for all work requests. Including
supervisory hours in total estimated design hours decreased
the accuracy for overestimated projects, because those
supervisory hours added even more hours to an already
excessive estimate. Conversely, including supervisory hours
in total estimated design hours increased the accuracy of
underestimated projects. Second, including the supervisory
hours resulted in an average difference of almost 58% between
estimated design hours and actual design hours as compared
to an average difference of almost 49% without including
supervisory hours in the estimate. For the above reasons,
further analysis will be conducted by using only the figures
pertaining to estimated design hours excluding supervisory
hour estimates. it must be noted that, beginning in FY86, PWC
Great Lakes began estimating supervisory hour requirements
for all projects.
2 . Single vs. Multi-Skill Projects .
As a general rule, projects requiring more than one
skill also require more design man-hours and reflect an
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increase in the complexity of design. At the very least,
there tends to be a certain amount of time used to provide
coordination between engineering disciplines. The database
revealed that two-thirds of the time the Engineer-in-Charge
(EIC) estimated a single-skill requirement when actually the
project required more skills. The assumption was made that
supervisory requirements, administrative requirements, and
engineering technician requirements were skills requiring
estimation as well as the standard engineering disciplines,
this assumption largely accounts for the large disparity
between estimated number of single-skill projects and multi-
skill projects (almost two-thirds of projects designed
actually used more than one skill). The remainder were
differences in the number of skills required in multi-skill
projects. Intuitively, the underestimate of skills required
to design a project would indicate the necessity of more
estimated design hours. In reality, however, over two-
thirds of the work requests examined were overestimated.
This difference, therefore, is deemed to have little effect
on design costs .
3 . Over- and Underestimated Hours .
The findings in this area were among the most
significant of the entire study. A summary of over- and
underestimated hours by plus/minus percentage ranges is




Estimation Error > +_ 100%
Estimation Error < +_ 100%
Estimation Error < +_ 75%
Estimation Error < +_ 50%
Estimation Error < jf 25%
Estimation Error < +_ 10%
Estimation Error < + 5%








Figure 8. Estimation Error (percentage ranges)
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procedures as they currently exist. Seventy percent of the
time actual design hours will be within a range as wide as
plus or minus 100% of estimated design hours. This means
that 70% of the time a work request actually requiring 100
hours to design will result in an estimate between and 200
hours. The remainder of the time the estimate will be
greater than 200 hours. Only in approximately 53% of pro-
jects will estimated design hours be within a range of plus
or minus 50%.
Since funds are issued to PWC based upon the
estimated design hours, the potential for providing too much
or too little funding is significant. As has already been
seen, nearly two-thirds of all estimates overestimate design
hours. Therefore, PWC holds significant amounts of customer
funds only to return them at a later date. While PWC holds
these funds, the customers are unable to use money that will
eventually be returned to them. In many cases money
returned late in the fiscal year comes too late for the
customer to spend or otherwise obligate efficiently or
legally. Such money is lost to the customer (generally to
the customer's major claimant). The effects on future
years' budgets is not positive. The effect of
underestimating design hours by a significant amount is
just as bad and possibly even worse. In order to complete
the design, more design hours must be paid for. In general,
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the customer must pay for these. This requires the customer
to immediately reprogram the current budget to provide extra
design funds. In most cases this means taking money planned
for the construction of the project and using it for design.
The general effect is to increase the total. cost of
construction to the customer.
The fiscal effect of estimation errors is
significant. overestimating occurred on two-thirds of the
projects designed. By applying a $30 per man-hour billing
rate to the total overestimated man-hours (7,341.3 hours,
representing 100% of the overestimated hours) the amount of
overfunding was calculated at $220,239. At the current
performance level of achieving estimates within 50%
approximately one-half the time, the overestimated hours
would still result in PWC holding excess funds of $200,655.
A more desirable range would be to estimate within 25%,
which would result in holding excess funds of $209,445 when
overestimates occur. Underestimates occurred on the
remaining one-third of the projects. A parallel analysis
reveals the total underestimated man-hours to equal 1,941.2
hours, resulting in cost overruns totaling $58,236. At the
50% and 25% performance ranges, cost overruns would amount to
$20,421 and $43,356, respectively. While these numbers
do not appear to be large, they do not reflect the entire
FY85 workload. In addition, these are aggregate numbers.
50
The effect on individual customers could be quite signifi-
cant in terras of their budgets. These activities may not be
able to accommodate such differences.
In comparing the above calculations with Figure 6
(Chapter IV), a very interesting observation is made. While
only 53% of the projects are estimated outside plus or minus
50% of actual design hours, these projects account for 79%
of the total over- and underestimated hours.
From PWC's perspective, the issue of over- and
underestimating design man-hours leads to difficulty in
scheduling work requests for design. The scheduling of work
requests is done according to estimated design hours.
According to the results listed above, any schedule made by
Production Scheduling Division or by Production Engineering
stands an extremely good chance of being inaccurate the
moment it is printed. Although scheduling will be discussed
in more detail later, it is obvious that productivity
suffers because of inaccurate estimating. Most work
requests are overestimated. This leads to engineers,
technicians , and administrative assistants awaiting work.
This waiting time is non-productive. Production Engineering
has only a certain amount of non-productive time budgeted,
and this is also used as one measure of performance. This
time is then included in the overhead rate. The great
temptation is to charge non-productive time to specific
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work requests that have not actually been worked on. In
effect, this practice would lower PWC costs while increasing
the cost to the customer. In studying PWC, Great Lakes, no
evidence of this practice was found.
4 . Regression Analysis
Regression analysis was conducted in an attempted to
measure the reliability of estimated design hours in
predicting actual design hours. Several steps were taken in
the regression process. First, total estimated design hours
were regressed against total actual design hours. Second,
to improve the "goodness of fit", standard data
transformations (detailed in Figure 9) were performed on both
estimated and actual design hours and then regression was
performed again. third, multiple linear regression was used
to evaluate individual skill estimates against total actual
design hours. The same types of data transformations used
previously were again used to evaluate the true significance
of the regression process. Finally, the projects were
stratified into three size groups based upon man-hours (0-
100, 101-300, and over 300). Regression was again performed
to observe the relationship between estimated design hours
and actual design hours. The measure used to evaluate
the results of regression was the coefficient of










Estimated Hours w/supervisory hours
Estimated Hours w/o supervisory hours
Actual Hours
Estimated Civil Engineer Hours
Estimated Mechanical Engineer Hours




Square Root of EHS
Natural Log of EHS
EH
Square Root of EH
Natural Log of EH
Dependent Variables R^
AH .204
Square Root of AH .381
Natural Log of AH .447
AH .209
Square Root of AH .317
Natural Log of AH .425
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
E421, E422, E423, E424 AH





Figure 9. Regression Results
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(from the mean) of the dependent variable that can be
explained by the independent variable.
Figure 9 provides a tabular presentation of the
results of the regression attempts. One significant finding
is that the inclusion of supervisory hours improves the
ability to predict actual hours. The purpose of the data
transformations performed was to provide both dependent and
independent variables with distributions that more closely
approximated the normal distribution. The rise in the
coefficient of determination indicates that the natural
logarithmic transformation provided the greatest
correlation, Nevertheless, it must be observed that the
predictive ability of estimated design hours is below 50/1,
even with transformed data. Using the raw data just as they
were collected indicates a reliability of only 20%. While
these result indicate the existence of some relationship,
it is not reliable enough to use for predicting. It is clear
that there may be other independent variables missing from
the model. It was stated earlier that some possibilities
were current working estimate, project complexity, and
number of drawings required.
Multiple regression was attempted by using the
estimates for individual engineer skills as independent
variables, the best r value attained was 28.9% using all
skills but administrative and technicians. Data
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transformations yielded no increases in the coefficient of
determination. The implication here is that using aggregate
man-hour estimates rather than estimates by individual skills
provides greater predictive ability. Still, the overall
reliability of estimates is only 44.7% at best, when the
natural log transformation is used.
B. ANALYSIS OF WORK REQUEST MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
1 . Work Request Evaluation Procedures .
The most positive finding of the study was that the
work request evaluation procedures are very effective. PWC
insures that representatives of all parties concerned are
present at the weekly meeting of the screening committee
(The composition of this committee was listed in Chapter
II). This fact alone insures that each work request gets
a fair and equitable treatment. In addition, it allows
for negotiation, reassignment, and readjustment of work
requests. Negotiation is necessary when a work request
hasn't been sufficiently defined to allow PWC to understand
what work is being requested. Reassignment is necessary
when either the design backlog or the shop work backlog is
too great to provide timely service. In the first case, an
A-E will be engaged to perform design; and, in the second
case, a contract will be awarded for work performance.
The evaluation procedure for deciding which design
force to use needs clarification. Listed below are the
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factors which are evaluated in making the decision between
PWC design forces and A-E design forces:
- size of job
- complexity of job
- current skill inventory (in-house)
- current design backlog
- NAVFAC goals (20% PWC design: 80% A-E design)
- current A-E load
- training requirements
Currently the head of Production Engineering subjectively
evaluates each work request with respect to the stated
factors. For example, the size of the job may be large
enough to indicate the use of an A-E firm but training
requirements for new engineers and technicians dictate
performing the design by in-house forces. The evaluation of
all these factors becomes totally subjective because there
are no written guidelines and there is no formal decision-
making model or procedure currently established.
Assigning strict numerical values to these factors
is almost impossible, To force a numerical weighting system
upon these factors might be effective, but it would still be
based upon subjective assumptions. Until further analysis
can be accomplished a decision model should be used that
addresses all factors, while taking into account as many
subjective assumptions as possible.
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2. Production Scheduling Procedures for Production
Engineering .
Production scheduling actually takes place in two
stages for project design. First, production Scheduling
(Code 350) schedules work to be released to Production
Engineering on a weekly basis [Ref. 4], Second, Production
Engineering schedules daily work for the following week
based upon manpower availability, skill requirements of
current projects, and the priority of projects available for
design [Ref. 6]. Each week Production Engineering forwards
a report of manpower availability to Production scheduling.
Based upon this report, the current status of projects being
designed, and the priority (and number) of work requests in
the backlog, the scheduler provides a list of current
projects already working and new projects to be started.
This schedule is prepared so that the man-hours for the
amount of work assigned are equivalent to 50% of the
available man-hours. The schedule is provided to Production
Engineering. The EIC then schedules each work request on the
basis of the skills required to perform the design,
availability of those skills, and priority of the request,
this internal schedule is based upon 80% of the available
man-hours
.
There are two major discrepancies in this process.
First, Production Schedules projects based solely upon total
design hours estimated for each project, without regard to
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specific skills, In addition, the schedule is based only
upon 50% of reported available man-hours. By not scheduling
with respect the skills required on a particular project,
the total man-hours available may numerically fill Produc-
tion Engineering's schedule, when in fact one skill (Civil
Engineering, for instance) may be overloaded and another
skill (Mechanical Engineering) may have nothing scheduled.
In addition, the 50% limitation may leave many engineers and
technicians idle. The second major discrepancy is the fact
that Production Engineering does its scheduling based upon
80% of available man-hours and this schedule takes into
account the requirements for each engineering discipline.
The resultant situation can be illustrated by a brief
example
.
Suppose that, for a given week, Production Engineer-
ing has 500 total man-hours available for design (100 for
each discipline. Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, Architectur-
al, and Technical Support). Production Scheduling will
schedule only 250 hours of projects without regard to indi-
vidual skills' availabilities. Assuming an equal distribu-
tion of skill requirements, this provides 50 hours of work
for each discipline. The .EIC receives the schedule, reviews
it and then attempts to schedule 3 0% of the 500 available
hours (or 400 hours). Still assuming an equal distribution
between disciplines, the EIC discovers that there is a 30
hour discrepancy per discipline.
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In the past, the above situation has resulted in the
EIC requesting more projects from the scheduler. Communica-
tion problems have developed between the two divisions as a
result of the difference in scheduling procedures. It is
necessary for both procedures to take place. What is also
'necessary is to schedule from the same assumptions as much
as is possible. In addition, the basis of scheduling needs
to be changed.
3 . Backload Management
There are two backlogs managed at PWC. The first
backlog is that of work awaiting performance by PWC shops.
The second backlog is that of work awaiting design by
Production Engineering. Periodic reviews of these backlogs
take place during screening committee meetings. The sizes
of the backlogs and estimated waiting time before work
begins are evaluated. When the backlog becomes too large,
the screening committee recommends he reassignment of work.
Work awaiting shop performance is put into contracts and
performed by civilian contractors. Work awaiting PWC design
is combined and sent to A-E firms for design completion.
This practice is an excellent means of providing faster
service. Current practice is extremely effective in
managing the size of the backlog.
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C. EVALUATION OF PRODUCTION ENGINEERING PRACTICES
1 . Internal Organization .
The internal organization previously charted (Figure
2) was changed beginning in FY86. Production Engineering
moved to a matrix organization, as presented in Figure 10.
Under the old organizational structure, projects were
assigned by the EIC to the engineer with the "lead
discipline". The lead discipline generally had the greatest
number of estimated design hours and, therefore, became
responsible for scheduling, coordination, and effective use
of support by engineering technicians under his direction.
Under this system, each engineering discipline had a
somewhat stable work force. The difficulty with this system
was that the EIC was responsible to track projects through
many different engineers. Also, engineers in the same
discipline had to compete for the same technical support.
Conflict arose over which project engineering technicians
would work on first. The resulting confusion adversely
affected productivity. [Ref. 1]
The new organization presents 4 EIC's who secure and
manage teams of engineers and engineering technicians
assigned to specific products. In arranging these teams,
there is competition for the most productive workers. Once
































































project design is completed. The EIC's schedule work that
comes to them and are responsible for insuring timely
completion of design. Any one person may be on more than
one design team, but team designations are strongly
associated with the projects; so, conflicts concerning what
work to do first should be reduced. In addition, since
EIC's compete for design resources, questionable performers
are quickly identified, since competition is keenest for
productive personnel. Furthermore, beginning 1 October
1986, all drawings, plans, and specifications must be signed
by the engineer responsible for them. This signature
represents the engineer's "liability" for the design
contained in these documents. The expectations of this
signature requirement are that it will improve the
engineers' quality control efforts, and in doing so, will
increase the quality of design. [Ref. 1]
The goals of this reorganization are to improve
productivity, to improve quality of design, and to reduce
the unit cost of design.
2 . In-House vs. A-E Design
Appendix A displays the progress that PWC, Great
Lakes has made toward achieving the NAVFAC goals for
contract design stated previously. Nearly every person
interviewed at PWC, Great Lakes agreed that 20% in -house
design and 80% A-E design was an ambitious goal. The
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consensus opinion between engineers and managers was that 40%
in-house and 60% A-E design is a more realistic target. The
reasoning behind these figures is that competition for
quality engineers is high. In order to attract and maintain
the best young engineers, enough "good" work must be
maintained in-house to motivate them. "Good" work is
generally the larger (sometimes more prestigious) projects
requiring engineering challenges and learning opportunities.
These projects are, for the most part, automatically
designated for A-E design. If the NAVFAC goal is actively
pursued, the remaining design tends to be small, repetitive,
unchallenging work. Intuitively, this might indicate a
savings in design time. Unfortunately, most of the buildings
and facilities at Great Lakes are of very old design and
structure requiring historical knowledge and/or experience
in their special problems. This is not the most attractive
type of work for training new engineers.
Figure 11 displays a recommended decision process to
evaluate the decision to perform design by using either an
A-E firm or in-house design resources. The decision
variables are ranked in order of importance to PWC as a
whole. The same ranking would not necessarily be given by
Production Engineering. This process is already being
performed by the decision head of Production Engineering.
3y presenting this in a graphic form, each decision can be
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Figure 11. Recommended Decision Process
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documented to discover patterns in decision-making. While
monetary savings are not a direct result, better decision-
making may lead to more efficient use of design resources.
3 . Design Equipment
In FY85 PWC began the acquisition of Computer Aided
Design and Drafting (CADD) equipment. This equipment is a
computer system designed to allow faster, more reliable, and
more accurate design. Appendix C provides more specific
description and capabilities. At the time of this study
only one of six work stations had been installed. The
dollar savings on the 18 projects already completed using
the CADD were over $26,000. These savings represented
drafting alone, as engineering services won't be performed
until all six stations are available. Estimated yearly cost
savings are $80,000 for each work station. Further cost
savings are planned because the accuracy of drawings and
designs performed on the CADD are expected to reduce
significantly the number and cost of change orders on
contracts. These savings have been estimated at $150,000 per
year. The utility of this system alone will greatly
increase the productivity of Production Engineering.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The amount of design work at PWC, Great Lakes is large
and requires an efficient design decision-making process and
a productive design force to provide timely, quality-
service. The development and documentation of a decision
process is essential to effective use of the design
resources available. Of more immediate importance is the
improvement of productivity within the Production
Engineering Division. Steps have already been taken by
reorganization and by the acquisition of technologically
advanced design equipment. Further improvements will be
achieved by the implementation of the recommendations
contained in this thesis.
3. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Work Request Evaluation .
The evaluation of each work request by the Screening
Committee and subsequently by the Production Engineering
division head is the most positive strength in the
management system. The diagram of work flow presented
in Chapter II provides the flexibility for modifications in
the face of future refinements of the organization and
policy changes affecting the flow of work.
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2. Design Man-hour Estimation .
Current accuracy in estimating design man-hours
requires improvement. With less than 50% of man-hour
estimates falling within plus or minus 50% of actual design
man-hours, there is something amiss witli current estimation
procedures. The intent of this study was to develop a
statistically valid man-hour estimation model based upon
historical data. The specific estimation techniques used
were not studied. Thus, no conclusions were reached as to
the cause of estimation difficulties.
The practical significance of inaccurate design man-
hour estimations is that an overestimate of man-hours result
in overfunding a project. PWC then holds these extra funds
until design is complete. Thus, these funds are useless for
other purposes by customers, until such time as the design
is completed and the overestimate is recognized. That may
be too late in the fiscal year for the funds ever to be used,
Since must of the work is loaded toward the end of the
fiscal year, the potential loss of funds due to overesti-
mated design man-hours is great. Underestimated projects
represent cost overruns. When PWC exceeds estimated man-
hours and requires more funds, the customer must immediately
reprogram funds to continue the design or drop the project
until another time. While only occurring approximately 33%
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of the time, such cost overruas may be significant to the
individual customer's budgets.
From PWC's viewpoint, scheduling is done based upon
the estimated design man-hours. Inaccurate estimates render
schedules ineffective. Communication difficulties between
Production Management and Production Engineering are brought
on by the difference in Production Management's scheduling
procedures and scheduling procedures internal to Production
Engineering. (The scheduler schedules 50% of available man-
hours while Production Engineering schedules to 80% of
available man-hours.) These differences must be resolved by
management at PWC. The resolution of these problems will
result in smoother operations and increased productivity
through better scheduling.
3 . Design Equipment .
PWC is already aware of the potential in Computer
Aided Design and Drafting (CADD). It should expedite the
procurement of the CADD system, although the cost savings
projections appear to be slightly understated. A savings of
more than $26,000 has been documented on 18 complete design
projects using the CADD only for the drafting portion of
design. By extending this rate of savings to cover 144
projects (comparable to the database analyzed), over
$200,000 in savings would result, When all 6 work stations
are installed, the cost savings should indeed be
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significant. The effect on productivity should be very-
great. Customers will benefit ultimately by reduced cost
for design and a better quality product.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are two recommendations that can be made as a
result of the research in this thesis. First, PWC should
adopt and document the use of the A-E vs. in-house decision
model (or some variant of the model) proposed in Chapter V
(Figure 10). This will provide PWC an indication of the
pattern of decision-making within Production Engineering.
It will also provide a greater awareness of the relationship
with NAVFAC goals and with internal considerations such as
training requirements and skill availability. The model
presented is easily modified to reflect any changes in
policy, organization, or priority of factors contained in
the model. Using this model as a decision-making form
included in each project folder would allow documentation of
the decision process. A database could be constructed to
evaluate the decision-making process.
Second, PWC should address the estimation process for
design hours. Reference 7, a study done for the Air Force,
proposes to make design hour estimation a performance
criterion for engineers. A copy of this study should be
procured and examined for further suggestions on the
improvement of estimation. PWC should also procure a copy
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of the thesis, Cost Estimation of Architect & Engineer
Contracts
,
[Ref. 9]. This thesis contains an analysis of A-
E contract design estimation procedures at Western Division,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command. The statistical model
contained therein could be of some use in developing a
predictive model for use at PWC, Great Lakes. This thesis
is available from the Defense Technical Information Center
(The address is contained in the distribution list at the
end of this thesis).
D. FUTURE RESEARCH
Several areas are recommended for future research.
First, with the acquisition of the CADD system,
documentation is already being kept concerning any reduction
in the amount of change orders on awarded contracts. A
study of change orders on contracts designed using the CADD
system would provide information significant to design
organizations throughout the Navy.
Second, the cost of in-house design and the development
of a cost estimating model is still of primary importance.
The requirement in this case is so urgent and such a large
task that it is difficult to undertake with only one person.
A team of analysts with direct and frequent access to
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Explanation of Column Headings
t-hrs: Total estimated hours (including supervision)
t-hrsa: Total estimated hours (excluding supervision)
420a: Estimated administrative hours
421: Estimated civil engineer hours
422: Estimated mechanical engineer hours
423: Estimated electrical engineer hours
424: Estimated architectural hours
420t: Estimated technical support hours




































Estimated number of design skills required
Actual number of design skills required
Actual design hours
Actual Administrative hours
Actual civil engineer hours
Actual mechanical engineer hours
Actual electrical engineer hours
Actual architectural hours
Actual technical support hours
calendar days to complete project
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ABBREVIATED SYSTEM DECISION PAPER (ASDP)
1. The need for this acquisition is to expand the existing
Graphic Engineering and Mapping System (GEMS) in the
Engineering and Planning Division. All references to GEMS
herein after will be Computer Aided Design and Drafting
(CADD). The functional requirement of the hardware is to
generate engineering drawings in support of maintenance of
Naval Shore Facilities. The current methods of drawing
generation is through the use of conventional drafting/
analysis methods and the utilization of the CADD System
which includes a single graphic workstation. the current
conventional methods of drawing generation provides minimal
possibilities of data exchange and integration for future
production projects.
2. The selected alternative is to expand the existing CADD
system from one to six workstations. The existing Central
Processing Unit (CPU) has the capability to execute ten
independent tasks at any one time (includes plotter, remote
peripherals, etc.). Many of the existing engineering and
technical staff have already completed introductory level
training in anticipation of expanding the CADD System to
include all authorized personnel. Intermediate level
training would begin promptly upon notification from
NAVFACHQ of approved subject hardware acquisition. No
additional software will be required at this time. Hardware
acquired under this request should be installed by 1 October
1986 due to the contractual requirements negotiated by the
General service Administration (GSA). Implementation of
multi-discipline applications would begin immediately upon
installation of requested hardware due to the training
completed by existing personnel. Advanced software would
not be used until at least FY88.
3. The only two alternatives considered were manual/conven-
tional methods and stand-alone m ini- wo rks t a t io ns . Manual
methods prevent accurate data exchange and integration
between Planning, Utility, Security, Engineering and
Estimating Divisions within the NAVFAC organization. Stand-
alone mini- workstations were not a selected alternative due
to existing hardware already in operations and being capable
of being expanded upon. It is in the best interest of the
Navy, when considering the economics involved, to expand the
existing system rather than install new stand-alone work-
stations.
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4. Projected costs are itemized as follows:
Hardware
Instaview Color Workstation (5 @ $39,100) $195,500.00
Maintenance
Full Service Contract (5 @ $3,576) $17,880.00 yr.
Personnel
No additional personnel required
Training
Intermediate level training for approximately 12 people,
currently trained at the introductory level, would take
place immediately after installation of subject acquisition
at the PWC, Great Lakes CADD side (approximate cost $1,500).
Coraputervision is currently under contract with the Navy to
provide educational services upon request. These services
are provided through NAVFACENGCOM , Alexandria, Code 04M4.
Site Preparation
The following is a
preparation that are
subject hardware.
list of approximate costs of site
necessary prior to installation of
A/C Unit
Dedicated Circuits











Equipment installation will require relocating existing
mechanical engineers to a different location of permanent
residence. All site preparation and relocation of personnel
can be accomplished with shop forces.
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Intangible Savings
Cost savings which are forecasted and incalculable are the
reduction of change orders, reduction of AE fees, reduction
of utility disruptions and database integration within the
NAVFAC organization.
Tangible Savings
One of the large paybacks with a CADD System is drafting.
Generating drawings on a CADD System versus manual methods
requires approximately one-third to one-half the normal
time. Based on statistics submitted in enclosure (1), each
workstation could save approximately $80,000 per year in
drafting support alone (based on $30.00/hr overhead rate).
Savings on the reduction of change orders are anticipated to
exceed $150,000 per year per workstation. This savings is
based on an estimate of 15% of the total CWE for change
orders on CADD produced work.
5. The hardware requested in this acquisition will
interface with the Co m p u t e r v i s i o n Designer V CADDS 4X
(w/200X upgrade) processor. No interface problems are
anticipated due to sole source hardware acquisition.
6. Funding will be provided by NPWC, Great Lakes upon
request. Funding for this acquisition was budgeted for FY
86 and 87.
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COMPUTER RESOURCES ACQUISTION (ASDP Supplement)
1. Instaview High resolution Color Interactive Graphics
Workstation.
2. The hardware will be located in the Production
Engineering Division. Code 420 CADD Area, of Building lA,
Great Lakes, Illinois. This hardware will also be located
in a secured area and accessible to authorized personnel
only .
3. Point of contract is Mr. Mark T. Heinzen, CADD System
Manager, Code 420MH at 312-688-4766/4285.
4. System life is estimated at seven to ten years.
5. Total contract value is estimated at $195,500.00 based
on five workstations at $39,100.00 each.
6. Workstation must be compatible with the existing
Computervision Designer V CGP-200X processor and capable of
utilizing CADDS 4X rev 4.0 or later software.
7. No additional software support is required at this
time. Maintenance support for the hardware in this
acquisition will be added to the existing CAEDOS Contract
Administered through China Lake.
8. The cost of site preparation is estimated at
approximately $14,000.00.
9. N/A
10. The estimated date of delivery is 1 September 1986.
11. No hardware will be released as a result of this
acquisition .
12. Method of acquisition will be sole source selection of
vendor currently on GSA Schedule.
FSC Group 70 - Part 1 - Section A
FSC Class 7025 - ADP Input/Output and Storage Device
Contract: GS00K86AGS5737
Period of Contract: 23 December 85 thru 30 September 86
Vendor: Finalco Incorporated (Phone #(800)346-2526)
8200 Greensboro Drive
Post Office Box 3606
McLean, Virginia 22103
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